I've written two philosophy papers since that other one I posted.

I'm not yet satisfied with the second one.

Here's the third. My purpose was to write about, "What does it mean to be a human? What does it mean to be a person?" while including philosophies covered recently in class (e.g. existentialism).

Nick Stephanoff

Philosophy 101

Paper 3

11/20/06

It is common for a decision-maker to consider what is “right” and what is “wrong.” When we use the terms this way, we are typically talking about what should be done. Assuming that some courses of action are better than others, we can understand that it is right to take the best course of action. Further distinction can be made between “good” courses of action, which generate or prevent the loss of value and “bad” courses of action, which cause the loss of value. At this point, value can be understood as nearly anything, according to one’s own philosophy – for a utilitarian, fulfilling the desires of the many; for an Aristotelian, edifying virtue; for an ubermensch, fulfilling one’s own whims, etc. In order to understand what is valuable to our self and to others, we must first understand who we are. By understanding what it means to be a human and an individual, we learn how to treat our self and one another. Firstly, I would like to consider the idea that a living human being is an individual substance of human body and human soul. Following closely, I propose that a person is an individual substance of rational nature. By “nature” I mean an essential nature, in the sense of potency rather than just functionality. As a challenge to my position, I would like to write about the existentialist view on the human person. While the word “existentialism” has evolved to include many meanings, it has the fundamental concept of existence before essence, which strongly contradicts my own philosophy. Either way I know that I am a person, and as a result of this paper I hope to better understand the significance of this to my choices.

Firstly, I will clarify what it means to be a living human being. This is an expansive term, which I will only briefly cover in order to maintain close relevance to my purpose of guiding action (how I should exist). In general, scientists use functionalist criteria to distinguish living substances from nonliving substances. Living things have a purpose (or purposes), which typically expresses itself through the way in which those living substances exist (although it does not necessarily have to be expressed; consider a plant that is poisoned or an animal that is trapped alone in a hole for its entire life). According to scientific classification, we understand human beings as creatures who typically grow into a humanoid form, which has various organs made of cells that carry a recognizable set of genetic molecules. Also, humans can be recognized by their hunger (which they satisfy by eating) their sexual urges (which they satisfy by mating), etc. We know the basic form and function of humans, which allows us to identify them when those attributes are expressed in a substance’s existence. Furthermore, we are familiar with the human mind – sometimes referred to as, or coupled with the human “soul.” By this, I mean to point out the intellectual form humans take, and the rational functions that they tend to express: communication (common to most animals), free will (which many consider unique to humans), innovation, etc.

This rational existence that we understand as a human function is part of a human being’s interior life. A human being can be an acting subject, which makes us special among substances that exist. This part of our essence makes us persons. I propose that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Allow me to explain: by “individual” I mean that people are separate substances, essences, and existences (n.b. the difference between “separate” and “independent.” Also, any redundancy here is an accident of covering my bases thoroughly.) By “nature” I mean “essence” – the fundamental whatever-it-is that defines what we are and what we can become. Allow me to emphasize the latter: we are not solely defined by what we are; part of our being is tied to what we can be in the future. Just so, a tree is not essentially a plant with a trunk and branches, because it was once a seed. While a seed, its essence was not different – it has been the same continuous substance, which changed over time into another potential version of itself. Similarly, as people change, they do not become different persons, because their essence is not changing; the expression of their essence changes. You are yourself now, just as you were yourself ten years and ten seconds ago. You did not have the same physical and even intellectual characteristics in the past that you do now, but you know that it has always been you. So you see, we are defined by our essence, which describes our potential; since we are persons, our essence has two definitive qualities: substance and rationality.

I believe that this idea of personhood and essence is true, but I must admit that it is subject to controversy. For example, the existentialist school of thought claims “existence before essence.” Allow me to explain, according my understanding: I will draw largely from Existentialism is Humanism, by Jean-Paul Sartre. He writes, “Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.” In his writing, Sartre explains that crafted things come from an idea or process, and thus have an essence before their existence. He goes on to argue that if there is no God, then man is not crafted in such a way, and thus has existence before essence. Aside from the controversy of his atheism, which I evidenced against in my first paper, there are other flaws in Sartre’s argument. For one, Sartre takes his own analogy too far. He correctly understands that by defining us, essence is a limitation (as well as an empowerment!) on personal actuation (becoming and doing what we choose). However, this does not mean that essence must be intelligently guided (although it could be). One might take the logical position that our genetic makeup, which comes to be in a semi-deterministic manner (further consideration of which is off-topic), and certainly not by our own choice, has a role in defining our essence. The idea that we are only what we make of ourselves can not be true, since human persons are quite definitively “made” by their parents. Now, I admit that there is some truth to Sartre’s idea: by our own free will (which we have because of our essence) we make choices that change the way in which we exist (within the definitive confines of our essence). In a very true sense, we change ourselves and we are changed. I maintain, however, that we do not become a new and separate person, but a continuous and different one. Thus, we can judge criminals based on the things that they have done, even if they presently exist in a law-abiding fashion. I must question whether Sartre could come to the same conclusion about law enforcement, based on his definition of what it means to be a human person. If our existence comes before our essence, then we are essentially different when we exist differently, and thus it is illogical to judge a person based on their existentially different past actions, because they are essentially not the same person that they were before.

Indeed, the existentialist idea seems to support many dubious moral conclusions. If we are moral beings only because we have a moral existence, then do we cease to have moral relevance when we sleep? What about when a person becomes unconscious? They may no longer have a rational existence (irrelevant of the coma’s duration). It seems obvious that it is wrong to kill or maim a living human who is suffering from a five-minute coma, but according to existentialist thought, it also seems that they no longer have the essence of a human person. Sartre writes that “…to begin with [man] is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself.” When does man cease to be “nothing?” According to Sartre, it is when he “makes himself.” By deduction, the verb “make” requires action, which must be performed by a subject. The implication seems to be that the subject is “making himself” by the actions that he or she chooses. This suggests that Sartre considers human beings to be “nothing” until they can make choices – and that they can choose to remain as nothing (or possibly choose to become worse than nothing!). Logically, “nothing” has no value. I trust that the conscience of you, the reader, shares my own conscience’s objection to treating infants as value-less substances. Many additional objectionable moral conclusions arise, such as punishing criminals without any regard to their possible rehabilitation. Hope for rehabilitation is a result of understanding the human essence that they have – the essence that comes before their existence, and gives them value according to their potential.

In an expansive sense, the philosophy of existentialism seems to say that “human persons can be valuable… but only if they make the right choices.” This is in direct conflict with my own philosophy that all human beings are valuable – GOOD – because they have an essence that is defined not just by who they are, but by who they can become. It is largely understood that human beings are identifiable by their human body and their human mind. I have come to the conclusion that a human person is an individual substance with a rational essence. In the face of existentialist philosophy, which according to Sartre states that existence comes before essence, reason has led me to believe that essence comes first. It is the source of potency for active existence. A man is not just what he makes himself: he is also what can become, through his own choices and anything that might change him – most definitely including the natural processes that bring an infant to maturity! As a result of this, I conclude that it is right and good to acknowledge and respect the personhood of any being who has the possibility of realizing a rational nature.